The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International Court of Justice\u27s Jurisprudence by Pomerance, Michla
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 20 Issue 1 
1998 
The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the 
International Court of Justice's Jurisprudence 
Michla Pomerance 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Organizations Law 
Commons, and the Rule of Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michla Pomerance, The Badinter Commission: The Use and Misuse of the International Court of Justice's 
Jurisprudence, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31 (1998). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol20/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE BADINTER COMMISSION: THE USE AND




It has long been the dream of those anxious to increase the role of
adjudication in international relations that the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ," "International Court," or "the Court") would act in the
international arena as a superior court-a forum whose pronouncements
would nourish, sustain, and help unify the jurisprudence of other inter-
national tribunals, whether of an ad hoc or standing nature, and of
national courts handling international law issues.' In the context of self-
determination, the Arbitration Commission of the European Commu-
nity's Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia ("the Badinter Commission,"
"the Commission," or "the Arbitration Commission") would appear, at
first glance, to have taken significant steps toward bringing this dream
to realization. From 1991-1993, the Badinter Commission rendered le-
gal opinions relating to the break-up of the Yugoslav Republic (SFRY)
2
* Emilio von Hofmannsthal Professor of International Law, Department of Interna-
tional Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Research for this article was
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Maya Shapiro, for her help in assembling relevant materials.
1. This perspective on the Court's potential future role is well reflected, for example,
in the U.S. Senate discussions in 1973. See Hearings on S. Res. 74, 75, 76, 77, & 78 before
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 93rd. Cong., 1st Sess., passim (1973). See, espe-
cially, the discussion of S. Res. 76 and 78; and e.g., statement of Leo Gross, id. at 155.
2. The text of the first ten opinions (rendered between November 1991 and July 1992)
and of some accompanying materials is reproduced in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration
Commission: Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Jan. 11
and July 4, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1488 [hereinafter Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Com-
mission 1991-1992]. The later five opinions, of July/August 1993, appear in International
Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Documentation on the Arbitration Commission under
the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference: Advisory Opinions Nos. 11-15 of the Arbitration Com-
mission, July 16, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1586. For background and summary of the first set of
opinions, see the introductory note by Maurizio Ragazzi, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbi-
tration Commission 1991-1992, supra at 1488. For analysis of the Commission's opinions,
see the detailed critique by Matthew C.R. Craven, The European Community Arbitration
Commission on Yugoslavia, 1995 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, and the more cursory and adula-
tory evaluation of Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A
Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 178 (1995). On
Pellet's possible authorship of some of the opinions, see Gregory H. Fox, Self-Determination
in the Post-Cold War Era: A New Internal Focus?, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 733, 750 n.82
(1995) (book review).
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and in so doing quoted liberally from the opinions and decisions of the
ICJ and ostensibly relied on them in matters of both competence and
substance. Upon closer examination, however, the Commission appears
to have misused more than used the International Court's jurisprudence.
Far from serving as the lodestar for the Commission, that jurisprudence
instead provided a reservoir of formulas (themselves not free of ambi-
guity) which were unquestioningly repeated and, in some cases,
questionably extended by the Commission in inappropriate contexts.
The long-range results of the Commission's application of ICJ law
could more plausibly harm than facilitate the goal of having self-
determination questions adjudicated in judicial and quasi-judicial fora.
I. CHALLENGES TO THE BADINTER COMMISSION'S COMPETENCE
Although labeled an "arbitration commission," the Badinter Com-
mission lacked the characteristics of an arbitral forum, which is
normally set up by the parties to a dispute by a compromis in which the
agreed applicable law is usually specified.3 None of the Commission's
For help in understanding the role of the Arbitration Commission within the confusing
welter of permanent and ad hoc international institutions amongst which it opeiated, see, for
the earlier period, Marc Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Social-
ist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569 (1992) and the introductory note
by the legal advisor to the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Paul C.
Szasz, Documents Regarding the Conflict in Yugoslavia, Sept. 25, 1991-Nov. 16, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1421. For the post-1992 period, see, for example, Paul C. Szasz, Peacekeeping in
Operation: A Conflict Study of Bosnia, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 685 (1995) and Paul C.
Szasz, The Protection of Human Rights through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bos-
nia, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 301 (1996) (providing a useful appended "Glossary of Acronyms,
Abbreviations and Other Specialized Terms Used in or in Connection with the' Dayton/Paris
Agreement on Bosnia"). There is a plethora of publications related to the political back-
ground, among which may be cited: DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY (1995); MISHA
GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR (rev. ed. 1994); SUSAN L.
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE COLD WAR (1995);
LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION (rev. ed. 1997); Ivo H.
Daalder, Fear and Loathing in the Former Yugoslavia, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
OF INTERNAL CONFLICT 35-67 (Michael E. Brown ed., 1996); MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL.,
SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 32-38 (1992); Payam Akhavan, Self-
Determination and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia: What Lessons for the International
Community?, in SELF-DETERMINATION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 227-48 (Donald
Clark & Robert Williamson eds., 1996).
3. The Commission was not created by the parties, but by the EC (of which neither
Yugoslavia nor its constituent republics were members), within the framework of the EC's
Conference on Yugoslavia. It was established pursuant to the EC Declaration of August 27,
1991, as supplemented by the EC ministerial joint statement of September 3, 1991, and with
the stated purpose of helping to ensure the "peaceful accommodation of the conflicting aspi-
rations of the Yugoslav peoples." However, those "peoples," as opposed to the Yugoslav
republics, were not represented before the Conference or the Arbitration Commission. The
August 27 Declaration spoke of undefined "relevant authorities" who would be entitled to
[Vol. 20:31
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pronouncements were formal decisions: all of them-the ten opinions of
1991-92 and the additional five given in 1993-were advisory (or
"consultative") in nature. The Commission's competence to give opin-
ions requested was twice challenged by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) and twice upheld by the Commission-the first time
submit their differences to the Arbitration Commission. In the September 3 statement, it was
provided that the Chairman of the EC peace conference would be the one who would trans-
mit to the Arbitration Commission the issues submitted for arbitration and who would then
report the results of the Commission's deliberations to the peace conference. See Conference
on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at 1488-89; Weller, supra
note 2, at 576-77. In fact, the Chairman, Lord Carrington, played an active role in fashioning
the questions presented and did not act as a mere conduit, even with respect to issues which
the parties-especially Serbia-wished to have addressed by the Commission. See Craven,
supra note 2, at 341. The primary "arbitral" feature consisted in the provision for appoint-
ment by the Yugoslav presidency (acting unanimously) of two of the five arbitrators. (The
other three were to be appointed by the EC and its member states). Since the Yugoslav presi-
dency was unable to agree unanimously on suitable candidates, the two additional
"arbitrators" were appointed by the three EC-appointed members. As originally composed,
the Commission consisted of the Presidents of the French, Italian, and German Constitutional
Courts (Robert Badinter, Aldo Corasaniti and Roman Herzog), who, in turn, selected the
President of the Spanish Constitutional Court (Francisco Tomas y Valiente) and the Presi-
dent of the Belgian Cour d'Arbitrage (Conflicts Court) (Irene Petry). Badinter, a prime
mover in the establishment of the tribunal, was selected by the Commission members to be
their chairman. See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra
note 2, at 1488-89; Craven, supra note 2, at 336-37.
The law which the Arbitration Commission was to apply was not specified in the EC
Declaration of August 27, although the selection of Constitutional Court presidents might
have pointed to the expectation that Yugoslav constitutional law would be a major compo-
nent of the applicable law. Indeed, since the "arbitration" was not (initially, at least) between
states, but rather between internal parts of a state ("relevant authorities," in the terms of the
Declaration), internal law was a logical point of departure. See Craven, supra note 2, at 339-
40 & n.44. In fact, the Commission purported to base its opinions on international law,
(including the controversial concept of jus cogens). It may be noted that, despite reference to
the right of secession in the governing 1974 Yugoslav constitution (as in earlier post-war
Yugoslav constitutions), the existence of such a constitutional right for the member republics
is not readily sustainable. Closer inspection of the relevant clause and of Yugoslav constitu-
tional doctrine reveals the extent of the ambiguity. See generally Ben Bagwell, Yugoslavian
Constitutional Questions: Self-Determination and Secession of Member Republics, 21 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 489 (1991). The so-called secession clause in the governing 1974 Consti-
tution refers to the right of secession as the premise for the establishment of the SFRY, but it
nowhere posits a future, continuing right of secession, as can be seen from its text:
The nations of Yugoslavia, proceeding from the right of every nation to self-
determination, including the right to secession, on the basis of their will freely ex-
pressed in the common struggle of all nations and nationalities in the National
Liberation War and Socialist Revolution, and in conformity with their historic as-
pirations, aware that further consolidation of their brotherhood and unity is in the
common interest, have, together with the nationalities with which they live, united
in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities and founded a so-
cialist federal community of working people-the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.
Yuo. Co NsT., Basic Principles, pt. I, para. 1 (1974) (emphasis added).
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by means of a formal "interlocutory decision," and the second time by
means of informal "reactions" by members of the Commission (given
collectively).
1) In June 1992, Lord Carrington, Chairman of the Conference for
Peace in Yugoslavia, requested the Commission's opinion on three
questions bearing on the status of the FRY in international law.4 He
wished to know whether the dissolution of the SFRY was now com-
plete;' whether the FRY was the sole successor to the SFRY or a new
state whose recognition was subject to European Community Guide-
6lines; and how problems of state succession were to be settled among
the emerging successor states. The Commission's competence to pro-
nounce upon these questions was challenged jointly by the Presidents of
Serbia and Montenegro on behalf of the FRY.7 Inter alia, they argued
that "all questions involved in the overall settlement of the Yugoslav
crisis should be resolved in an agreement between FR Yugoslavia and
all the former Yugoslav republics," and that "all legal disputes which
cannot be settled by agreement ... should be taken to the International
Court of Justice, as the principal judicial organ of the United Nations."8
4. For text of the questions leading to Opinions 8-10, see Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at 1518-19.
5. In its first, and pivotal, opinion, of November 29, 1991, the Commission had con-
cluded that the SFRY was in the process of dissolution. See id. at 1494-97. The EC had
come to that conclusion previously and had proceeded, on the basis of that assessment, to
plan future steps, including the threat of sanctions against Serbia. See Weller, supra note 2,
at 582-83.
6. The text of the Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union," adopted by the European Community on Dec. 16,
1991 is reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992).
7. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at
1519.
8. Joint letter of June 8, 1992 by the Presidents of Serbia and Montenegro (English
translation supplied by Bosnia-Herzegovina from the original Serbo-Croat), cited in Case
Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1993 I.C.J. 17, para. 29 (Apr. 8) (Provisional Meas-
ures). The letter continued: "Accordingly, and in view of the fact that all the issues raised...
are of a legal nature, FR Yugoslavia proposes that in the event that agreement is not reached
among the participants in the Conference, these questions should be adjudicated by the In-
ternational Court of Justice, in accordance with its Statute." Id. In the Genocide case, Bosnia
later sought to rely on the joint letter as evidence that Serbia had implicitly consented to the
jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to all outstanding Serbian-Bosnian legal disputes. Id. at
18, para. 30. This interpretation was hardly tenable, since the Serbian suggestion was, at
most, an offer to adjudicate, by mutual consent, specific disputes in the future. The Court,
justifiably, deemed the letter to be an insufficient ground for endowing the Court with prima
facie jurisdiction for the purpose of indicating provisional measures. See id. at 18, paras. 31-
32. In the Preliminary Objections stage, the Bosnian gloss was more definitively rejected.
Serbia, the Court said, had not accepted a binding and immediate commitment "to accept
unconditionally the unilateral submission to the Court of a wide range of legal disputes."
Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
[Vol. 20:31
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Serbia also contested the Commission's right to pronounce upon its own
competence. 9 The Commission rendered an "interlocutory decision"
rejecting the challenge to its competence, and proceeded to issue the
three opinions requested (Nos. 8, 9, and 10), in a manner unfavorable to
the FRY stance.' °
2) The Arbitration Commission was reconstituted in January 1993
under new terms of reference, a partially new composition, and a more
defined competence consisting of both contentious and advisory juris-
diction." While the Commission was authorized to give decisions "with
binding force for the parties concerned" on "any dispute submitted to it
by the parties thereto upon authorization by the Co-Chairmen of the
Steering Committee of the [International] Conference [on the Former
Yugoslavia],' 2 the Commission was also specifically empowered (as it
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 225, para. 37 (July 11)
(Preliminary Objections).
9. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at
1519.
10. Id. at 1521-26. The Commission held that the SFRY no longer existed, its dissolu-
tion having been completed; that the FRY was not sole successor to the SFRY; that none of
the successor states could claim exclusive membership rights of the former Yugoslavia in
any international organization; that problems of state succession were to be negotiated and
settled equitably among the successor states, taking into account the relevant provisions of
conventional and customary international law; and that the FRY was a new state whose rec-
ognition was subject to the European Community Guidelines.
11. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Documentation on the Ar-
bitration Commission under the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference: Terms of Reference,
Reconstitution of the Arbitration Commission, and Rules of Procedure, Jan. 27-Apr. 26,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1572, 1572-78 [hereinafter 1993 Terms of Reference]. The reconstituted
five-member "Arbitration Commission" was to comprise: (a) three members chosen by the
European Community's Council of Ministers "from among incumbent Presidents of Consti-
tutional Courts ... in member States of the European Community or from among members
of the highest courts in those States, it being understood that for the present these members
are those from France [Robert Badinter], Germany [Roman Herzog) and Italy [Francisco
Paolo Casavola]"; (b) one member chosen by the President of the ICJ either from among
former ICJ judges or among those having the qualifications specified in Article 2 of the ICJ
Statute; and (c) one judge of the European Court of Human Rights designated by that Court's
president. Id. at 1573-74. The new composition reflected the increased importance attached
to international law and human rights law, in light of the intervening events in the former
Yugoslavia. The two judges selected under categories (b) and (c) were Jos6 Maria Ruda of
Argentina, former President of the ICJ, and Elizabeth Palm of Sweden, Judge of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. Id. at 1574. Judges ad hoc (who might be appointed in
contentious proceedings only) were to be either sitting judges in the constitutional or highest
courts of members of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe); or,
alternatively, they were to possess the qualifications specified in categories (b) and (c) with
respect to regular members of the Arbitration Commission. Id. at 1573.
12. The earlier EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia (the "Carrington Conference") was
replaced in late August 1992 by the joint U.N./EC-sponsored International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia. Its permanent steering committee had two co-chairmen: Cyrus
Vance, special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General; and David Owen, acting (as
successor to Carrington) on behalf of the EC, See OWEN, supra, note 2, chs. 1-2; Szasz, The
Fall 1998]
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had not been in its earlier incarnation) to render its advice on "any legal
question" which would be "submitted to it by the Co-Chairmen of the
Steering Committee of the Conference."'' 3 The explicit dual-jurisdiction
of the Commission paralleled that of the ICJ, and in the Arbitration
Commission's new governing instrument, the paragraph on the advisory
jurisdiction-including the "any legal question" formula-was clearly
modeled on the stipulations of Article 96 of the U.N. Charter and Arti-
cle 65 of the ICJ Statute. 4 In this round, too, the Arbitration
Commission adopted and published formal rules of procedure on April
26, 1993." These rules, however, differed greatly from those of the ICJ,
particularly in the informality and secrecy of the contemplated pro-
ceedings, and in the expectation that the advisory procedure would not
normally include oral hearings. Moreover, judges ad hoc were not to be
permitted in the Commission's advisory proceedings. 6
Protection of Human Rights through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia, supra
note 2, at 302, 316; James B. Steinberg, International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Con-
flict, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 27, 46
(Lori F. Damrosch ed., 1993).
13. 1993 Terms of Reference, supra note 11, at 1573.
14. Article 96(1) of the U.N. Charter empowers the General Assembly and the Security
Council to request advisory opinions from the ICJ "on any legal question." Other U.N. or-
gans and specialized agencies may, according to Article 96(2), request opinions "on legal
questions arising within the scope of their activities," if authorized to do so by the General
Assembly. Correspondingly, Article 65(l) of the ICJ Statute provides that the Court "may
give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of whatever body may be
authorized by or in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to make such a re-
quest." For an analysis of the formulation and purport of these provisions, see MICHLA
POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND
U.N. ERAS 24-44, 296-316 (1973).
15. 1993 Terms of Reference, supra note 11, at 1575-78.
16. With respect to advisory procedure, the ICJ rules were essentially those developed
by its predecessor, the PCIJ, which had gradually but consistently assimilated its advisory to
its contentious procedure, thus lending to advisory opinions a far greater authoritativeness
than had initially been expected. Secret advisory opinions had been ruled out from the be-
ginning, and all subsequent efforts to resuscitate the idea had been rebuffed. See, for
example, the draft provision in 1922 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, at 414. Judge Anzilotti argued
for allowing secret advice in the interests of world peace, but the views of Judges Moore and
Finlay that secret advice would be incompatible with the Statute and "would be a death blow
to the Court as a judicial body" prevailed. Id. at 160. In 1923, a proposal for secret con-
sultations was renewed by Judge Altamira and forcefully opposed by Judge Moore. See 1926
P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2 (Add.), at 293-96. On the crucial importance of non-adoption of the
provision for secret advice, see JOHN BASSETT MOORE, 7 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN
BASSETT MOORE 10-11 (1944). With respect to judges ad hoc, these had only been allowed
since 1927. For discussion of the history of the relevant provisions and their subsequent
invocation in the Namibia case, see Michla Pomerance, The Admission of Judges Ad Hoc in
Advisory Proceedings: Some Reflections in the Light of the Namibia Case, 67 AM. J. INT'L
L. 446 (1973). In the Western Sahara case, 1975 I.C.J. 15-16, para. 9 (May 22), the ICJ, for




Several days before the adoption of these rules of procedure, six
questions were submitted to the Commission by David Owen and Cyrus
Vance, the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference.'7
The competence of the Commission to give advisory opinions on the
questions posed-all bearing on issues of state succession to the assets
and obligations of the former Yugoslavia-was vigorously challenged
by the FRY Government. In its "Statement" (which was not officially
addressed to the Commission, presumably because the Commission's
competence to determine its own competence was also denied), the FRY
declared that "in the sense of international law the Arbitration Commis-
sion was not established or composed for arbitration purposes"; that in
its substantive work "it has been seriously in breach of both the law of
procedure and the implementation of material law"; that the questions at
issue "should be referred by agreement either to the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ... or to an ad hoc arbitration court"; and that, in sum, the
FRY "shall consider null and void and non-binding any opinion of the
Commission adopted in the procedure to which it has not agreed."'"
The Commission's response was contained in unanimously adopted,
but informal "Reactions" of the Commission members to the FRY
statement, and was conveyed on May 26, 1993 to the Co-Chairmen of
the Steering Committee. 9 In all but form, however, the "Reactions"
amounted to a preliminary decision affirming competence to give the
opinions requested.
FRY objections to the Badinter Commission's decision to deal with
the state-succession questions at issue were restated, even more firmly,
in a letter of July 2, 1993, addressed to the Conference Co-Chairmen.
Besides reasserting the claim that the Commission had violated interna-
tional legal norms, both as to procedure and substance, the FRY
protested:
It should also be noted that the Commission provided for the rendering of an opinion
within three, and exceptionally, four months of the receipt of a request. In the original EC
Declaration of Aug. 27, 1991, the Commission was required to render decisions within a
two-month period. Exceeding this expectation, the Commission delivered its first ten opin-
ions well before the end of the specified period; and in the crucial first opinion, which
defined the international status of the SFRY, in just over a week. In all, the Commission's
rules, as well as its practice, tended to lend to that body a far less judicial character than that
of either of the two world courts.
17. See International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Documentation on the Ar-
bitration Commission under the UN/EC (Geneva) Conference: Questions Submitted to the
Arbitration Commission and Statements Relating to Their Submission, Apr. 20, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1579, 1580-81 [hereinafter Questions and Statements 1993].
18. Id. at 1581-82.
19. Id. at 1582-84. Since the FRY had not presented an official challenge, the Commis-
sion presumably did not feel it appropriate to issue a formal "interlocutory decision."
Fall 1998]
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In practice the opinions of the Commission, as an advisory body
of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, on
the basis of which the Yugoslav participants at the Conference
were to adopt relevant decisions by consensus taking also into
account the Commission's opinion, were taken as judgments
and served as a basis for making concrete decisions on relevant
issues concerning the Yugoslav crisis.
2
0
"Resort to any court mechanism" was, in the FRY view, premature
as long as there had not been any "substantiated and comprehensive dis-
cussion on the principles on the basis of which the property of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia should be ceded to successor States."2
Moreover, should judicial clarification nevertheless be necessary, it
should be sought, as the FRY had often insisted, "within a court proce-
dure in accordance with international law. 22 In the meantime, "pending
discontinuation of the work of the so-called Badinter Commission," the
FRY would temporarily suspend its further participation in the Working
Group on Succession Issues, set up by the Conference. 23 Additionally,
the FRY would consider the Commission's opinions and "the decisions
and acts of other subjects based thereupon" to be "null and non-
binding. '
II. THE COMMISSION'S PRONOUNCEMENTS ON COMPETENCE
In its response to the first challenge to its competence, the Commis-
sion felt it necessary, first of all, to establish its right to determine its
own jurisdiction, its competence de la compgtence which, as noted, Ser-
bia had contested. But, in its attempt to do so, the Commission exhibited
considerable confusion as to its own legal nature, and invoked ICJ
precedents bearing on tribunals which were arbitral or judicial in nature,
though the Commission decidedly was neither arbitral nor judicial. The
Commission also implied that all the disputing parties had consented to
its role-again an invalid proposition in this context. Using rather so-
phistic reasoning, the line of argument adopted by the Commission was
basically the following:25 1) The original intention of the European
Community ministers was to establish an arbitral procedure leading to
20. Id. at 1584 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1584-85.
22. Id. at 1585.
23. Id. at 1584.
24. Id. at 1585.




"decisions." 2) The terminology used and the projected composition
showed that arbitration was indeed intended. 3) The six republics agreed
to the arrangements, thus consenting, presumably, to the establishment
of a forum with arbitral powers. 4) Arbitral tribunals traditionally have
the power to determine their own jurisdiction. 5) The right of standing
tribunals to determine their own jurisdiction is even more incontestable
than the corresponding right of arbitral tribunals set up for specific dis-
putes. 6 6) Hence, the Commission was empowered to decide on its own
jurisdiction.
The legerdemain involved in this line of reasoning is obvious. In
fact, regardless of the original intention (if such there were), the Com-
mission was neither an arbitral body nor an established court; hence, the
precedents cited were not pertinent. It was disingenuous to imply that all
the disputants had given the kind of preliminary consent associated with
a true arbitral procedure or with an existing judicial institution based on
a constitutive instrument to which the disputing states were contractu-
ally committed. Indeed, the six republics were not members of the Euro-
pean Community which had set up the "Arbitration Commission"-a
point also relevant to the issue of absence of consent to the rendering of
advisory opinions. Nor was the principle of forum prorogatum applica-
ble in this case to the FRY since, with respect to the questions under
consideration, the FRY had never indicated even implicit consent to
having its interests passed upon by the Commission. What needed to be
examined and was, indeed, next addressed by the Commission was the
Commission's role as dispenser of advisory opinions delivered in the
face of objections of one of the disputing parties. Here the Commission
purported to base itself squarely on the advisory legacy of the ICJ, but
here again the Commission's reasoning was seriously flawed, and its
use of precedents in non-analogous situations, misplaced.
The advisory competence of the Commission, it stated, had also
been recognized. The proof? Serbia had, in November 1991, taken the
initiative and submitted three questions to the Commission (two of
which had been transmitted together with an additional one formulated
by the Chairman of the Conference). Furthermore, "all the Republics
took part in this procedure and none made the least mention of any in-
competence on the Commission's part, demonstrating an identical
interpretation of its mandate, and thereby recognizing its competence in
consultative issues as well.
27
26. For the last two propositions, the Commission cited the ICJ pronouncement in Not-
tebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111, 119 (March 21) (Preliminary Objections).
See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at 1520.
27. Id.
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How could the consent given in regard to these earlier consultations
extend as well to later consultations to which objection was taken? In
what instrument and by what actions could the FRY be said to have
committed itself to accepting any and all consultations of the Commis-
sion bearing on the interests of the FRY? The Commission appeared not
to notice the problem; but -it proceeded, nevertheless, to use formulas
and terminology employed by the ICJ in its advisory practice.
In particular, the Commission's statements echoed those enunciated
by the International Court in the Peace Treaties case28 and cited by the
Court several times thereafter. Those statements established a judicial
doctrine affirming an obligation to participate in the work of the U.N.,
barring compelling countervailing reasons.29 The Commission's version
of the doctrine was expressed in this manner:
The Arbitration Commission also notes that it was established
in the framework of the Conference for Peace as a body of this
Conference. Replying to the questions put by the Chairman of
the Conference constitutes Commission participation in the
work of the Conference, of which it is a body, and it would re-
quire conclusive reasons to bring it to refuse such a request....
The Conference for Peace in Yugoslavia has a mission "to
reestablish peace for all in Yugoslavia and to achieve lasting
solutions which respect all legitimate concerns and legitimate
aspirations." (Joint Statement of 7 September 1991 at the
opening ceremony of the Conference).
Consequently, in attempting to enlighten the Conference on
the legal aspects of problems which it encounters in carrying
out this mission, the Arbitration Commission remains fully
within the role entrusted to it by the European Community and
its Member States on the one hand and the six republics on the
other.30
In answer to the second FRY challenge to the Commission's com-
petence, the terminology and concepts of the Peace Treaties case, with
its sharp differentiation between the advisory and contentious jurisdic-
tion of the Court, were repeated and, this time, explicitly cited. By the
time of the second challenge, as noted earlier, the Commission had been
28. Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J.
65, 71-72 (Mar. 30) [hereinafter Peace Treaties].
29. See infra notes 35, 42-44 and accompanying text.




reconstituted, and it had been endowed explicitly with an advisory ju-
risdiction.3 However, the FRY had in no sense bound itself to accept
that advisory jurisdiction, either in general or in respect to a particular
issue. Indeed, as has been seen, the FRY had protested that the Commis-
sion's opinions were effectively determining the outcome of matters in
dispute between the republics, and that thereby the legal right of the
FRY not to have its rights adjudicated without its consent was being
violated. Insisting, as had the ICJ in the Peace Treaties and some subse-
quent cases, that the consultation was a purely client-lawyer affair, the
rendering of which the concerned state should not be permitted to pre-
vent,32 the Commission members stated in their informal "reactions":
[F]irstly, ... the competence of the Arbitration Commission as
an advisory body stems not from the consent of the parties con-
cerned but from the mere fact of referral to it by the Co-
Chairmen of the Conference; secondly, the reply given by the
Commission to a question put before it in this context "is only
of an advisory character: as such it has no binding force" (cf.
ICJ, advisory opinion of 30 March 1950, Interpretation of
Peace Treaties, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 71).
As a consequence, it is for the Co-Chairmen, and for them
alone, to evaluate the desirability of a request for an opinion,
and the States participating in the Conference are not qualified
to prevent them from doing so. The opinion is given by the Ar-
bitration Commission not to the States, but to the Co-Chairmen,
in order to furnish them with information needed to take deci-
sions. The reply to such a request constitutes the Commission's
participation in the working of the Conference. In that regard it
may be recognized that, as the FRY Government writes, such
advisory opinions form part of the "subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law" referred to in Article 38, para-
graph 1 (d) of the Statute of the ICJ.
3
The Commission added that the parties could always utilize the
Commission's contentious jurisdiction "or any other adjudicatory or
arbitral body of their choice," should they fail to conclude successfully
the present negotiations, "for which the opinions of the Commission are
not binding but may serve as points of reference. 34
31 See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part III.
33. Questions and Statements 1993, supra note 17, at 1583.
34. Id.
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In order to evaluate the validity of the Commission's purported
adoption of the International Court's jurisprudence in the matter of con-
sent to advisory jurisdiction, it is appropriate to examine the ICJ's
approach to the problem and the validity of transporting that approach
to the very different context in which the Badinter Commission was op-
erating.
III. THE ISSUE OF CONSENT IN THE ICJ's ADVISORY JURISPRUDENCE
On several occasions, the ICJ was urged not to comply with a re-
quest for an advisory opinion on the grounds that the issuance of an
opinion would amount to the exercise of compulsory jurisdiction on the
basis of a majority vote in a political organ and the circumvention of the
requirement of state consent. To overcome these objections and cooper-
ate maximally with the requesting organ, the International Court was led
to emphasize the "organizational" aspects of the requests and corre-
spondingly to minimize their "quasi-contentious" aspects.35  Its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice ("PCIJ" or
"Permanent Court"), had tended to do the opposite: to look beyond the
formal source of the request to the true interests being litigated and to
blur, almost to the vanishing point, the distinction between the advisory
and contentious jurisdictions. In the matter of consent, the main PCIJ
precedent was the much cited and much misunderstood refusal to give
the League Council the advice it requested in connection with the
Finno-Soviet dispute over the status of Eastern Carelia. The Permanent
Court made it clear that it would not serve as the League's adviser
automatically and in all instances. In this case, the major obstacle to
compliance with the Council's request for an opinion was the fact that
the Council lacked the competence to recommend any solution regard-
ing a dispute in which Russia, a nonconsenting non-member of the
League, was involved.36 Subsequently, in the Mosul case, the Permanent
35. For a fuller discussion of the issue of consent in the jurisprudence of the ICJ and its
predecessor, see POMERANCE, supra note 14, at 279-84, 287-96. For a recent analysis of the
Court's "duty-to-participate doctrine," see Michla Pomerance, The Advisory Role of the
International Court of Justice and Its "Judicial" Character: Past and Future Prisms, in THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ITS FUTURE ROLE AFTER FIFTY YEARS 297-323 (A.S.
Muller et al. eds., 1997).
36. Advisory Opinion No. 5, Status of Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5,
[hereinafter Eastern Carelia]. The P.C.I.J. deemed it unnecessary to broach the general
problem of the consent of disputant states to advisory proceedings. Among "other cogent
reasons" for its refusal to reply in this case, the P.C.I.J. also cited the difficulty of elucidating
disputed facts without Russia's testimony. On the basis of the P.C.I.J.'s reasoning, the
"Eastern Carelia principle" could be said to relate to non-members of the League who,
moreover, had never accepted the Council's competence for the purposes of a particular
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Court appeared to depart somewhat from the earlier precedent, con-
senting to render an opinion despite the objections of Turkey, a non-
member of the League.37 However, there were essential differences be-
tween the two cases, and these, it would seem, were determinative for
the Permanent Court. Turkey had earlier, by treaty, expressly granted
the League Council a role in its dispute with Great Britain; had par-
ticipated all along in Council proceedings; and at one stage had even
explicitly consented to accept the Council's decision in advance.39 The
Council's request for judicial advice came at a very late stage in the
proceedings; and it involved not the question of whether the Council
had competence to take a decision-this was generally conceded-but
rather the question of what character the decision should have, and by
what vote it should be taken.4° In these circumstances, the League Coun-
cil's right to have judicial clarification was thought to be unassailable
and to outweigh the "quasi-contentious" aspects of the case. 4'
It was in the Peace Treaties case that the Eastern Carelia precedent
of the PCIJ was, in practice, overturned, though this was not done
overtly, as some states had urged, but by a somewhat inept attempt to
distinguish the two cases. As in the Eastern Carelia case, the Interna-
tional Court was faced with non-consenting, non-member states of the
World Organization who could be said to be "quasi-defendants" in rela-
tion to the request for an advisory opinion. Moreover, the requesting
organ's competence to deal with the root issue involved (in this case,
dispute. However, subsequently, the Eastern Carelia precedent was widely misconstrued by
writers (and even by the International Court of Justice, in the Peace Treaties case, supra note
28, at 71-72) to embrace the question of consent in general-at least where the request for
an opinion touches on the merits of an existing dispute. See POMERANCE, supra note 14, at
282-83, 287-92. For the context of the League Council's request, see id. at 65-69. Equally
misconceived was the attempt by some states (and the Court itself) to distinguish Peace
Treaties from Eastern Carelia on the basis of the "preliminary" nature of the questions in the
later case. See id. at 288 & n.36.
37. See Interpretation of Article 3(2) of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Tur-
key and Iraq) (Mosul Boundary), 1925 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 12.
38. Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923, 28 L.N.T.S. 11.,
39. See 1924 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1319-20, 1337, and especially, 1358-59.
40. See 1925 LEAGUE OF NATIONS O.J. 1317-27, 1336-37, 1377-82.
41. On the background to the Council's request, see POMERANCE, supra note 14, at 75-
78. Turkey's attitude to the Court, it might also be noted, differed greatly from Russia's in
the Eastern Carelia case. Turkey exhibited no general hostility to the Court and did not im-
pugn its credentials as an impartial forum. While objecting that the questions before the
Court were "of a distinctly political character" such as could not "form the subject of a legal
interpretation," Turkey stopped short of challenging outright the Court's competence to give
an opinion. Interpretation of Article 3(2) of the Treaty of Lausanne, supra note 37, at 8-9. It
also cooperated with the Court by furnishing relevant documents and replying to questions
posed. For its part, the Court did not find it necessary to address the question of Turkey's
position in the case.
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the observance of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania) had
earlier been challenged (resembling, in this respect, Eastern Carelia
more than Mosul). But the International Court held these facts to be no
bar to rendering an opinion. Adopting mainly the line of argument urged
upon it by the United States and the United Kingdom, the International
Court reasoned as follows: the Court's opinion is merely "advisory" and
is given to the U.N. General Assembly for its enlightenment; hence, no
state, member or non-member of the United Nations, can prevent the
giving of such an opinion. Moreover, "the reply of the Court, itself an
'organ of the United Nations', represents its participation in the activi-
ties of the organization, and, in principle, should not be refused. 42
Nevertheless, since the International Court is also the "principal judicial
organ," it must examine whether its judicial character bars it from giv-
ing the opinion in this case. 43 For this purpose, it was necessary to
distinguish the case from Eastern Carelia, as the International Court
proceeded to do by emphasizing the preliminary nature of the question
before it-the applicability of the dispute-settlement provisions of the
peace treaties, rather than the merits of the disputes regarding human
rights. Since the "sole object" of the request was "to enlighten the Gen-
eral Assembly as to the opportunities which the procedures contained in
the Peace Treaties may afford for putting an end to a situation which has
been presented to it," the International Court could find "in the opposi-
tion to it made by Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania no reason why it
should abstain from replying to the request." 4
On the other hand, individual judges found in that opposition strong
grounds for non-compliance. In contrast to the Court, they highlighted:
the "non-advisory" character which advisory opinions had come to as-
sume in practice; the substantive, nonpreliminary nature of the dispute
at issue; and the quasi-contentious, non-organizational aspects of the
opinion. Thus, on the force of advisory opinions, Judge Winiarski de-
clared: "States see their rights, their political interests and sometimes
their moral position affected by an opinion of the Court, and their dis-
putes are in fact settled by the answer which is given to a question
relating to them."45 "In practice," Judge Zori~id stated, "an advisory
opinion ... in regard to a dispute between States is nothing else than an
unenforceable judgment."46 The fact that the dispute before the Interna-
42. Peace Treaties, supra, note 28, at 71.
43 Id. at 71-72.
44. Id. at 72.
45. Id. at 92 (dissenting opinion of Judge Winiarski).
46. Id. at 101 (dissenting opinion of Judge Zori~id). In a separate opinion, Judge
Azevedo deemed particularly objectionable the attempt (by means of automatic institution of
a second phase of advisory proceedings, in the event the three states remained recalcitrant)
f[Vol. 20:31
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tional Court was not the original dispute about human-rights observance
but the subsequent dispute about the applicability of the dispute-
settlement procedures did not in any way detract from its nature as a
"dispute., 47 Though "preliminary" in relation to the main dispute, the
new controversy nevertheless constituted a "pivotal point" in the case,
even as the "preliminary" question in the Eastern Carelia case had
formed an important new dispute, separate from the merits.48 The formal
addressee of the opinion may be the organ which requested it, but the
real addressees were "the parties, the Organization, and ... public
opinion. 49
Thereafter, the problem of non-consent to an advisory proceeding
by a non-member of the World Organization would not again arise. The
Court could and did contend that U.N. membership, and concomitant
acceptance of Article 96 of the U.N. Charter (providing for Assembly
and Council requests for advisory opinions) sufficed to meet any objec-
tions to the International Court's competence to render the opinion
requested. ° Nevertheless, as a matter of propriety and the International
Court's admitted discretion to refuse to give an opinion in order to pro-
tect its judicial character, the Court continued to deal with the issue of
the absence of consent. In the end, however, no matter how strong the
claim of a non-consenting state to the status of "quasi-litigant" in an
advisory proceeding, the "organizational" stamp of the requests would
be underscored and deemed determinative. Thus, in the Namibia case,
the Court said:
It is not the purpose of the request to obtain the assistance of the
Court in the exercise of the Security Council's functions relat-
"to attribute material effects" to the Court's opinion. In his view, the opinion was thereby
endowed with "an enforceability sui generis somewhat in the nature of an interdict or a
writ." Id. at 86-87.
47. Id. at 93-94 (dissenting opinion of Judge Winiarski), 99-100 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Zoritid).
48. Id. at 87-88 (separate opinion of Judge Azevedo).
49. Id. at 97 (dissenting opinion of Judge Winiarski). Similarly, Judge Zoridid wrote:
[A] request for an opinion cannot be regarded as giving rise solely to a relation
between the Court and the international organ which asks for the opinion, but...
in addition to that relation, other relations may be established first, between the
Court and the parties, and, again, between the parties themselves.
Id. at 101.
50. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 23, para. 31 (Jan. 26) [hereinafter Namibia]. See also infra note 56 and accompa-
nying text, with respect to the position of Spain in the Western Sahara case. The Court's
views regarding the effect of accepting Article 96 of the Charter coincide with those ex-
pressed earlier by many writers. See, e.g., SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 357-58 (1958).
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ing to the peaceful settlement of a dispute pending before it
between two or more States. The request is put forward by a
United Nations organ with reference to its own decisions and it
seeks legal advice from the Court on the consequences and im-
plications of these decisions.5'
"The object of this request," the Court said, quoting from the Reser-
vations case,52 "is to guide the United Nations in respect of its own
action." The existence of "radically divergent views between South Af-
rica and the United Nations" served to convert the case neither into an
interstate nor even into a U.N. v. South Africa dispute. 3 The Court's
characterization of the case was criticized by Judge Gros, who deemed
it "a purely formal view of the facts ... which does not ... correspond
to realities, 54 and also by Judges Petr6n and Fitzmaurice.55
In the Western Sahara case the absence of Spanish consent was
clear and conceded by the International Court, and Spanish participation
in the case (unlike South African participation in Namibia) was not
deemed tantamount to consent to the rendering of the opinion.56 Never-
theless, the Court again concluded that the Eastern Carelia precedent
would be no bar to complying with the request. Differentiating more
clearly than in the past between competence and propriety, the Court
held that there could be no question, based on Eastern Carelia, of the
Court's incompetence to deal with the question. Correctly interpreting
that earlier precedent (as the Court in the Peace Treaties case had not
done), the Court said that a "decisive reason" for the Permanent Court's
refusal to give an opinion in Eastern Carelia had been the "lack of
competence of the League to deal with a dispute involving non-member
States which refused its intervention. 57 As for the present case, how-
ever, the Court observed:
Spain is a Member of the United Nations and has accepted the
provisions of the Charter and the Statute; it has thereby in gen-
eral given its consent to the exercise by the Court of its advisory
jurisdiction. It has not objected, and could not validly object, to
the General Assembly's exercise of its powers to deal with the
5 1. Namibia, supra note 50, at 24, para. 32.
52. Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 19 (May 28).
53. Namibia, supra note 50, at 24, paras. 32-34.
54. Id. at 326; see generally id. at 324-31.
55. Id. at 128-30, 313-16.
56. Western Sahara, supra note 16, at 23, para. 29. For the Court's reference to South
Africa's participation in the proceedings in the Namibia case, see Namibia, supra note 50, at
23-24, para. 31; and see id. at 156 (separate opinion of Judge Dillard).
57. Western Sahara, supra note 16, at 24, para. 30.
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decolonization of a non-self-governing territory and to seek an
opinion on questions relevant to the exercise of those powers.58
Nevertheless, the Court held that "the consent of an interested State
continues to be relevant, not for the Court's competence, but for the ap-
preciation of the propriety of giving an opinion."59 "In certain
circumstances" such lack of consent "may render the giving of an advi-
sory opinion incompatible with the Court's judicial character."0 That
these circumstances did not arise in this case was due, yet again, to the
"organizational" labeling of the case by the Court. The "legal contro-
versy ... arose during the proceedings of the General Assembly and in
relation to matters with which it was dealing. It did not arise independ-
ently in bilateral relations. 61 (On this reasoning, it is difficult to
comprehend why a judge ad hoc was approved for Morocco. The Court
must have had second thoughts on the "dispute" nature of the case; but,
as Judge Gros noted, it was either "unable or unwilling to modify" its
earlier contention.) 6
2
To strengthen the "organizational" argument, the Court asserted that
the request was "located in a broader frame of reference" than was the
earlier dispute, since it included future elements and the territory's ties
to Mauritania; 63 that the object of the request was to aid the General As-
sembly not in the pacific settlement of disputes but in the "proper
exercise of its functions concerning the decolonization of the terri-
tory"; 64 and that the Assembly possessed a "legitimate interest ... in
obtaining an opinion from the Court in respect of its own future ac-
tion., 65 That interest could not be "affected or prejudiced" by the fact
that an earlier Moroccan proposal for joint reference to the International
Court on kindred issues had been rejected by Spain. 6 Nor was Spain
correct in assuming that the Court would be adjudicating "existing ter-
ritorial rights or sovereignty over territory. 67 Nor again was there any
problem, as there had been in Eastern Carelia, of ascertaining the facts,
58. Id. The Court also noted that in the General Assembly, Spain objected to the for-
mulation of the request and its restriction to the historical aspects of the question, not to the
judicial consultation as such. Id.
59 Id. at 25, para. 32.
60. Id. at 25, para. 33.
61. Id. at 25, para. 34.
62. Id. at 71, 74.
63. Id. at 26, para. 38.
64. Id. at 26-27, para. 39.
65. Id. at 27, para. 41.
66. Id.; see generally id. at 25-27, paras. 35-42.
67. Id. at 28, para. 43.
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since sufficient "information and evidence" had been presented to the
International Court.
68
IV. THE COMMISSION'S MISPLACED ANALOGIES AND REASONING
As was seen, the ICJ pronouncements on the issue of consent have
themselves been sharply criticized from within the bench, on the
grounds that unlike the PCIJ, the International Court took too for-
malistic a view of its advisory function and disregarded both the real
interests that were being litigated by the circuitous advisory route and
the authoritative nature of the technically non-binding advisory opin-
ions.69 Indeed, in its anxiety to participate as "principal judicial organ"
in the work of the U.N., the Court, it would seem, was too ready to find
"organizational" stakes even where they were negligible or minimal in
comparison to those of the disputant states. In its defense, the Court
could point to one or more of the following considerations: the U.N.
membership of the non-consenting states (in the post-Peace Treaties
cases); occasionally (as in the Namibia case), the participation of the
contesting state in the proceedings as a form of ad hoc acceptance of the
Court's competence; the status of the World Organization in relation to
a wide spectrum of questions affecting international relations; and the
Court's own status as the Organization's "principal judicial organ."
In the case of the Badinter Commission, the criticism leveled
against the ICJ view is particularly apt, while the defense of the ICJ po-
sition is basically unavailable. Moreover, the Commission's defense of
its competence was perhaps even less persuasive regarding the FRY's
second challenge than with respect to the first. For by then, the authori-
tativeness, bordering on binding force, attributed to the Commission's
decisions by the EC, its members, and other international organizations
had become manifest;" the FRY's opposition to the Commission's in-
68. Id. at 29, para. 47. But compare the dissents on this point of Judge Petr~n, id. at 113,
and Judge de Castro, id. at 137-142. For the Court's dismissal of Rumanian objections in the
Mazilu case, see Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges
and Immunities of the United Nations, 1989 I.C.J. 177, 188-92, paras. 29-39 (Dec. 15);
Pomerance, supra note 35, at 306-07.
69. See supra notes 45-49, 54-55, 62, 68 and accompanying text. See also discussion
of the Peace Treaties case, in Leo Gross, The International Court of Justice and the United
Nations, 120 RECUEIL DES COURS 339-42, 361-70, 415-17 (1967-I).
70. As summed up by Craven, rarely had "a quasi-judicial body ... play[ed] such an
active part in the process of dismemberment" of a state. Craven, supra note 2, at 410. The
Commission's advice on recognition was basically followed by the EC and its members,
except for the recognition of Croatia prior to fulfillment of the conditions outlined by the
Commission and, contrariwise, the deferment of the recommended recognition of Macedonia
because of Greek opposition. (Greece objected to the use of the name "Macedonia" and
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volvement in its disputes with the other former republics of the SFRY
was indisputable; and, as Matthew Craven noted, any approval which
the FRY might have extended to the Commission's work initially was
not automatically transferable to the reconstituted Commission, now
functioning under a new mandate and with a changed composition.7 In
any event, as he correctly observed, the position of the U.N. vis-a-vis its
members was not comparable to that of the Conference for Peace in
Yugoslavia vis-t-vis the FRY:
feared irredentist demands on Greek territory.) Non-recognition by the EC of the FRY as
sole successor to the SFRY was expressly linked by the EC (in its joint statement of July 20,
1992) to the Commission's conclusions in Opinion No. 10. See introductory note by Ragazzi
in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at 1490.
Apart from their impact on the decisions of the EC and its members, the Commission's
opinions also influenced the decisions of other bodies. In particular, the momentous conclu-
sion, in Opinion No. 1, that the SFRY was "in the process of dissolution" apparently led the
U.N. and other international organizations to deny the FRY automatic membership as sole
successor to the SFRY, thus departing from the precedent set with respect to Russia after the
Soviet break-up. See Weller, supra note 2, at 593-94; Craven, supra note 2, at 335, 373,
379-80, 410. On the U.N. actions, see S.C. Res. 777, U.N.SCOR, 47th Sess. 3116th mtg., at
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992), and the Assembly resolution adopted pursuant to it, G.A.
Res. 47/1, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/47/I (1992). The latter resolution,
while noting that the FRY cannot "continue automatically" the SFRY's membership, deter-
mined that the FRY can no longer participate in the work of the General Assembly. This
differentiation between the membership of Yugoslavia (which was not explicitly terminated)
and participation in the work of the General Assembly (which was denied to the FRY) was
explicated in a memorandum by the U.N. Legal Counsel, Letter Dated 27 September 1992
from Under Secretary General, the Legal Counsel, Addressed to the Permanent Representa-
tives of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/47/485
(1992), but was held by the ICJ to be "not free from legal difficulties." Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.) 1993 I.C.J. 14, para. 18 (Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 8).
For a critique of the U.N. approach to the issue, see Yehuda Z. Blum, U.N. Membership in
the 'New' Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break?, 86 AM. J. INT'L J. 830 (1992), and Yehuda Z.
Blum, Correspondents'Agora: U.N. Membership of the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT'L
J. 248 (1993). For an attempt to make sense out of the conflicting U.N. precedents, see Mi-
chael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States and Membership in the United
Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29 (1995).
The Commission's opinions have also been faulted by critics for possibly precipitating
the premature recognition of Bosnia, thereby helping to engender the violence which the
adjudicatory and conciliatory processes were ostensibly designed to forestall. See, espe-
cially, the following comment by Paul C. Szasz, written in 1995: "Unfortunately, to the
extent that these opinions [Opinions Nos. 1-4] encouraged the Bosnian Government to seek
early independence, that step provoked the disaster from which Bosnia-Herzegovina is still
suffering .... Szasz, Peacekeeping, supra note 2, at 693; see also Craven, supra note 2, at
380; Weller, supra note 2, at 606. Regarding the Commission's views on the uti possidetis
principle, see infra Part V. Interestingly, Badinter himself apparently acknowledged later
(June 29, 1994) that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina brought about the disaster of
war. See Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the Borders of New
States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 614 n.192 (1992). This was also the assessment of OWEN,
supra note 2, at 46.
71. Craven, supra note 2, at 352.
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[The Conference] has no constituent instrument, possesses only
an ill-defined set of "organs", and does not prescribe the rights
and obligations of the participating States. It is one thing for
States to accept, by treaty, limitations on their sovereignty
through membership in an organization where the purposes and
powers of the organization are clearly set out, and where the
rights and obligations of the States vis b vis the organization are
defined in advance. It is quite another for such limitations to be
imputed to a State in virtue of its "participation" in an organi-
zation with an ill-defined and open-ended mandate.72
Nor was the analogy between the status of the ICJ as "principal ju-
dicial organ" and the functions of the Commission particularly
convincing. Nor again was it a simple matter to accept that the
"organizational" interest of the Conference in the questions of statehood
and succession should be allowed to override the very concrete interest
of the FRY in not having these questions adjudicated by means of a
quasi-compulsory jurisdiction foisted on the FRY without its consent.
This was all the more so since "the distinct identity of the Conference
could scarcely be discerned."73
The misuse by the Commission of International Court pronounce-
ments was not, however, limited to matters of competence; it was also
prevalent in the Commission's substantive pronouncements, especially
in the matter of the uti possidetisjuris principle.
V. UTI POSSIDETIS IN THE ICJ AND IN THE BADINTER COMMISSION
The ICJ's pronouncements on the issue of self-determination as
such are sparse, often Delphic,74 and the Commission does not appear to
72. Id. at 352-53.
73. Id. at 411.
74. These pronouncements have, however, been widely cited and recited unthinkingly,
misused and misinterpreted. In particular, commentators have often ignored the specific
contexts to which the Court's statements related and to which the Court was careful to con-
fine its comments. In general, the judicial pronouncements bore on matters of classic
decolonization where, moreover, the international organization concerned possessed some
specific authority (and the question of the extent of that authority was sometimes the issue to
be determined). Additionally, some of the Court's utterances were in the nature of obiter
dicta and lacked any practical consequences. See especially the Court's assertion in the East
Timor case (which it refused to adjudicate on jurisdictional grounds) that self-determination
is "one of the essential principles of contemporary international law" and that it has an "erga
omnes character." East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, 102, para. 29 (June 30); see
also id. at 213-16 (dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (regretting the fact that, under
the circumstances, no practical consequences attached to the Court's statement). For analysis
of the Court's approach to matters of decolonization (not self-determination in general), see
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have used them in any discernible way. On the other hand, the Commis-
sion extensively cited the dictum of an International Court chamber in
the 1986 Frontier Dispute case between Burkina Faso and Mali in the
matter of uti possidetis;75 and in so doing, the Commission extended the
principle in ways that are neither legally warranted nor necessarily po-
litically desirable.
In its second and third opinions, the Commission addressed two in-
terrelated questions initiated by Serbia and transmitted by Carrington:
1) "Does the Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, as
one of the constituent peoples of Yugoslavia, have the right to self-
determination?" 2) "Can the internal boundaries between Croatia and
Serbia and between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia be regarded as
frontiers in terms of public international law?
7 6
Responding to the first of these questions, the Commission deter-
mined (in Opinion No. 2) that "international law as it currently stands
does not spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination."
However, it continued, "it is well established that, whatever the circum-
stances, the right to self-determination must not involve changes to
existing frontiers at the time of independence (uti possidetis juris) ex-
cept where the States concerned agree otherwise."77 This proposition
was perhaps not as well established as the Commission thought," but it
Shabtai Rosenne, Decolonisation in the International Court of Justice, 8 AFR. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 564 (1996). On the purport of the Court's pronouncements in the Namibia and
Western Sahara cases, see MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRAC-
TICE: THE NEW DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS 69-70, 114 (1982).
75. See Opinion No. 3 in Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-
1992, supra note 2, at 1500 (citing Case Considering Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali),
1986 I.C.J. 565 (Dec. 22)).
76. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at
1498-99.
77. Id. at 1498.
78. Examples of skepticism regarding the legal credentials of the principle, even in re-
spect of Latin America, are legion. Thus, F.C. Fisher referred to the "indefinite and illusory
concept of uti possidetis, the meaning of which is still as uncertain as when the effort was
first made, over a century ago to elevate it to the dignity of a principle of American interna-
tional law." F.C. Fisher, The Arbitration of the Guatemalan-Honduran Boundary Dispute, 27
AM. J. INT'L L. 415 (1993). Citing the ambiguity of the principle, C.H.M. Waldock con-
cluded: "The doctrine of uti possidetis has proved to be so indefinite and ambiguous that it
has become somewhat discredited even as a criterion for settling boundary disputes between
Latin American states." C.H.M. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Island De-
pendencies, 1948 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 325. The ambiguity, as Waldock explained, revolved
primarily around "the question whether uti possidetis refers to possession de iure, that is, to
the Administrative boundaries as theoretically defined in Spanish Royal Decrees or ... to
possession de facto, that is, to the boundaries actually respected by the former colonial ad-
ministrations." Id. at 326; see also J.H.W. VERZIJL, 3 INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 552 (1970) (concluding that uti possidetis is only a "principle" and "not a rule
of international law proper"); YEHUDA Z. BLUM, HISTORIC TITLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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was less questionable than the extension of the principle, in Opinion No.
3, to internal administrative boundaries as well. (It was also less contro-
versial than some of the other statements in the preceding two opinions,
including the assertions that respect for the rights of minorities was a
peremptory norm of international law,79 and that the right of self-
determination alluded to in Article 1 of the two 1966 International
Covenants on human rights was, in essence, an individual rather than a
342 (1965) (citing evidence to support a similar conclusion). The deviations in U.N. practice
from strict application of the principle in the process of decolonization are also noteworthy.
See examples cited in POMERANCE, supra note 74, at 18-22, 30-31, 84-88, 97-98. For re-
cent discussions of the legal status and contours of the uti possidetis principle, see Ratner,
supra note 70, at 590-624, and especially 594-95, 598-601; Malcolm N. Shaw, The Heri-
tage of States: The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today, 1996 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75-
154, and especially 99 (affirming the legal nature of the doctrine).
79. In Opinion No. 1, the Commission stated that "the peremptory norms of general in-
ternational law and, in particular, respect for the fundamental rights of the individual and the
rights of peoples and minorities, are binding on all the parties to the succession." Conference
on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at 1496. In Opinion No. 2,
the Commission reiterated the proposition, stating that "the-now peremptory-norms of
international law require States to ensure respect for the rights of minorities. This require-
ment applies to all the Republics vis-4-vis the minorities on their territory." Id. at 1498. Yet
the jus cogens concept in international law, as the International Law Commission delibera-
tions preceding the adoption of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties made clear, is
controversial and not universally accepted. More important, the Vienna Convention, as is
well known, used the expression jus cogens wholly in a negative sense and provided no
substantive definition of the term. No principles which might qualify for thejus cogens des-
ignation were incorporated, even by way of illustration, mainly because of lack of agreement
regarding suitable candidates for the status. The ILC report on the matter mentioned some of
the matters suggested for incorporation by member states. These related primarily to the
unlawful use of force, the slave trade, piracy, and genocide, and, among "other possible
examples," also self-determination. Minority rights were not among the principles cited. See
Summary Records of the 703rd Meeting, 1963 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 198-99; Summary
Records of the 880th Meeting, 1966 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 247-49; Egon Schwelb, Some
Aspects of International Jus Cogens as Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61
AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 963-64 (1967); JERZY SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS AND THE VIENNA CON-
VENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 114-23 (1974). On the
problematic aspects of the jus cogens concept, see also Georg Schwarzenberger, Interna-
tional Jus Cogens?, 43 TEX. L. REV. 455 (1965). Among ICJ pronouncements, the kindred
concept of "obligations erga ones" appears in some obiter dicta-most prominently in the
Barcelona Traction case, where the Court listed in this category obligations "derive[d), for
example... from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the
principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection
from slavery and racial discrimination." Barcelona Traction, Light and Power (BeIg. v.
Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Feb. 5); see also East Timor, supra note 74. Even if one accepted
the Arbitration Commission's assertion regarding minority rights as jus cogens, further,
possibly insuperable difficulties would be presented by the need to define the referents and
scope of such rights and how they were to be reconciled with the rights of the individual. See
RUTH LAPIDOTH, AUTONOMY: FLEXIBLE SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS 9-23 (1997) and
the sources there cited; PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RIGHTS OF
MINORITIES 1-21, 164-72 (1991); HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 60-61 (1990).
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group right, permitting "every individual" to "choose to belong to what-
ever ethnic, religious or language community he or she wishes.""0 )
According to the Commission's pronouncements in Opinion No. 3,
international law mandated respect not only for all external frontiers but
also for the former internal boundaries in Yugoslavia, which "may not
be altered except by agreement freely arrived at."'" Support for this
proposition the Commission purported to find in the Court's jurispru-
dence:
This conclusion follows from the principle of respect for the ter-
ritorial status quo and, in particular, from the principle of uti
possidetis. Uti possidetis, though initially applied in settling de-
colonization issues in America and Africa, is today recognized
as a general principle, as stated by the International Court of
Justice in its Judgment of 22 December 1986 in the case be-
tween Burkina Faso and Mali (Frontier Dispute, [1986] ICJ
Reports 554 at 565): "Nevertheless the principle is not a special
rule which pertains solely to one specific system of interna-
tional law. It is a general principle, which is logically connected
with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wher-
ever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent the
independence and stability of new States being endangered by
fratricidal struggles ....
80. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at
1498. The case law of the U.N. Human Rights Committee reflects the opposing view, that
Article I endows only "peoples as such," and not individuals, with an implementable right to
self-determination. Petitions invoking Article I within the rubric of the Optional Protocol of
the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have, therefore, been dismissed by the Com-
mittee. See, for example, the treatment of cases relating to indigenous Canadian bands and to
petitioners from South Tyrol, cited in Hurst Hannum, Rethinking Self-Determination, 34 VA.
J. INT'L L. 1, 27 (1993/94); see also DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMIT-
TEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS 254-56, 266-68 (1994).
For criticism of this part of the Arbitration Commission's opinion, its lack of clarity and
questionable sustainability in international law, see Craven, supra note 2, at 393-95; Hurst
Hannum, Self-Determination, Yugoslavia, and Europe: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 3 TRANS-
NAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 65 (1993). It might be added that the Commission's osten-
sible theoretical "widening" of the definition of self-determination so as to embrace the
individual "self' has the practical effect of restricting the right of some of the claimants to
the collective right of complete self-determination and independence. It is, in a word, a way
of limiting the rights of non-favored "selves."
81. Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission 1991-1992, supra note 2, at
1500. The Commission prefaced its opinion with the statement that it was "mindful of the
fact that its answer to the question before it will necessarily be given in the context of a fluid
and changing situation and must therefore be founded on the principles and rules of public
international law." Id. at 1499.
82. Id. at 1500.
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To bolster these conclusions, the Commission referred to Article 5,
paragraphs 2 and 4 of the SFRY Constitution on non-alteration of the
Republics' territories and boundaries without their governments' con-
sent, and also to a series of international instruments declaring that
forceful alteration of boundaries would be without legal effect. 
3
Whatever the legal merits of the other bases of the Commission's
affirmation of the sanctity of the former internal administrative bounda-
83. Id. In applying the prohibition against the use of force, embodied in Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, to the context of the internal conflict in Yugoslavia, the Arbitration Com-
mission was following the policy line of the EC (which, in turn, was influenced mightily by
German pressure to "internationalize" the conflict), the United States, and the later stance of
the U.N. Security Council. For pointed criticism of this policy, see Rosalyn Higgins, Post-
modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession: Comments, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (Catherine Brolmann et al. eds., 1993):
This [principle that frontiers may not be altered by force] has ... been a guiding
precept in the various avis handed down by the Commission Arbitrale established
within the Conference on Yugoslavia .... [S]o far as normative guidance is con-
cerned, this [is] a somewhat unsatisfactory principle .... Does the principle...
mean that the federal government may use no force at all to prevent...
[secession, by unilateral declaration of independence of one of its provinces]? In
other words, may a frontier be altered unilaterally by one side, so long as the other
side is put in the position of using force to maintain the status quo? Or does the
principle.., mean that the old boundary between ... [the seceding province] and
what remains of the federal state must remain, and the federal state may not carve
out new facts on the ground by seeking to gain by force any strip of, or enclave
within, the newly seceding entity? Either way, the seceding state has the legal ini-
tiative .... [T]he mere repetition of the formula that boundaries may not be
changed by force does not begin to provide serious normative guidance to most of
the issues that face us today in the context of secessionism.
See also, in like vein, Hannum's assessment: "The principle that borders should not be al-
tered except by mutual agreement has been elevated to a hypocritical immutability that is
contradicted by the very act of recognizing secessionist states." Hannum, Self-
Determination, supra note 80, at 68. "The war crimes and crimes against humanity ... can-
not be cited in an ex post facto manner to justify the earlier secessions." Id. at 68 n.43. See
also Steinberg, supra note 12, at 66-67; and the statement of David Owen, infra note 92 and
accompanying text. On the EC policy, see Weller, supra note 2, at 575-77.
For U.S. statements opposing alteration of internal Yugoslav borders by force and
branding Serbian actions as internal aggression, see HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 35-
38; Hannum, Self-Determination, supra note 80, at 59-60; Steinberg, supra note 12, at 75
n.65; Weller, supra note 2, at 579-80. See especially James A. Baker, Violent Crisis in
Yugoslavia, Address before the U.N. Security Council (Sept. 25, 1991), in U.S. DEPART-
MENT OF STATE DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 1991, at 723-24. On divergent views in the U.N. on the
matter of the use of force and internal borders-both in the early stages, when the conflict in
Yugoslavia was still viewed as a secessionist struggle, and after the shift in attitude-see
Weller, supra note 2, at 577-81. The crucial German role in shaping the EC approach and
precipitating premature recognition of Croatia and Bosnia was widely, and generally criti-
cally, noted. See id. at 575, 586-88, 605; Daalder, supra note 2, at 50-51, 64; Steinberg,
supra note 12, at 37-38, 66; OWEN, supra note 2, at 24, 27; WOODWARD, supra note 2, at
183-89; Stephen Kinzer, Europe, Backing Germans, Accepts Yugoslav Breakup, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 16, 1992, at A 10.
[Vol. 20:31
The Badinter Commission
ries-and these have been seriously debated84-reliance on the Interna-
tional Court's jurisprudence, as several commentators have observed,
was certainly questionable.85 The principle of uti possidetis juris was not
in contention between the parties in the Frontier Dispute case. On the
contrary, in the Special Agreement by which the Chamber of the Court
was seized with the dispute, the parties had stipulated that the contro-
versy be settled in accordance with "respect for the principle of the
intangibility of frontiers inherited from colonization. 6 Thus, the
Chamber's statements regarding the status of the principle in general
customary international law were all a matter of dictum only. Moreover,
that dictum (which was cited by the Commission), when repeated later
in the same judgment specifically spoke not, as before, of cases of
"independence" but of "decolonization"87a narrow term than
"independence," in U.N. and ICJ discourse. Judge Luchaire emphasized
the importance of the distinction and cautioned against confusing the
two terms.88 It is also noteworthy that the uncompleted sentence at the
end of the passage cited by the Commission ended with the following
words: "provoked by the challenging of frontiers following the with-
drawal of the administering power"-a clear reference again to the
decolonization context.8 9
In fact, employment of the ICJ dictum was inappropriate in a deeper
sense. The issues before the Court in Frontier Dispute and those con-
fronting the Commission in relation to Yugoslavia were fundamentally
disparate. In the first case, the problem was a routine one, in which the
principles of delimitation were agreed, and only their application was
contested. The first three opinions of the Commission, on the other
hand, raised in a fundamental way the basic conundrum of self-
determination. The real issues, regardless of how they were semanti-
cally disguised, were: What was the unit of self-determination? How
was the "self' of self-determination to be defined, by whom, and on
84. See supra note 3 (discussing the tenuous constitutional basis for establishing the
proposition.)
85. See Ratner, supra note 70, at 598, 613-14; Craven, supra note 2, at 388; Hannum,
Self-Determination, supra note 80, at 66.
86. Case Concerning Frontier Dispute, supra note 75, at 557.
87. See id. at 566, para. 23. Even in the paragraph cited by the Arbitration Commission,
the uti possidetis concept is linked more frequently to "decolonization" than to independence
in general. Id. at 565, para. 20. The chamber's dictum, when read completely and in context,
appears designed primarily to emphasize that the rule was just as applicable to decoloniza-
tion in Africa as it was to earlier South American decolonization.
88. In legal discourse, Judge Luchaire wrote, "the term 'decolonization' should be used
only with great caution and must above all not be confused with accession to independence."
Id. at 652.
89. See id. at 565, para. 20. This point is aptly highlighted by Hannum, Self-
Determination, supra note 80, at 55.
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what grounds? Whose territorial integrity was deserving of preservation,
and why? If the secession of the republics from the SFRY was permis-
sible because the Federation was disintegrating, on what legal grounds
could further secession from those republics be legitimately opposed?
Why was one unit's self-determination more sacrosanct than that of an-
other? Why was the territorial integrity of the whole federation less holy
than that of the sub-units? And what of the territorial integrity of the
sub-sub-units, like Drajina and Petrinja within Croatia? (Or, for that
matter, of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia?) 90 By saying that uti
possidetis applies to internal administrative divisions, the Commission
was establishing them as the new "selves" entitled to self-determination
and territorial integrity. But denying self-determination to sub-units was
not really sustainable on legal grounds. Nor necessarily, for that matter,
on practical grounds either. Politicians, as one commentator remarked,
"do not draw internal lines with the possibility of secession in mind."'"
And if the rationale behind insistence on the universal application of uti
possidetis was the belief that greater chaos and fragmentation would
thereby be averted, that assumption would seem to have been disproven
by the evolution of the conflict in Yugoslavia. As David Owen, one of
the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia, later wrote:
My view has always been that to have stuck unyieldingly to the
internal boundaries of the six republics within the former Yugo-
slavia .... before there was any question of recognition of these
republics, as being the boundaries for independent states, was a
folly far greater than that of premature recognition itself. The
refusal to make these borders negotiable greatly hampered the
EC's attempt at crisis management in July and August 1991 and
subsequently put all peacemaking from September 1991 on-
wards within a straitjacket that greatly inhibited compromises
between the parties in dispute .... There can be no universal
solution, but a blanket ban on any boundary changes, particu-
90. Kosovo, in the south of Serbia, has long been an area of particular volatility within
the former Yugoslavia, with constant potential for major eruption in violence. Inhabited by
an overwhelming Albanian Muslim majority (about ninety percent of the population), it is
claimed by the Serbians as their historic medieval heartland and home to their most cher-
ished religious symbols. In northern Serbia, Vojvodina contained a sizable minority (of
about 10%) of ethnic Hungarians. Both areas enjoyed enhanced autonomy under the 1974
Constitution, but in 1989-90 Serbia moved to restrict and abolish their autonomous status.
See LAPIDOTH, supra note 79, at 227 nn.7-8; Steinberg, supra note 12, at 31-32; Misha
Glenny, Bosnia I?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at A39.
91. Ratner, supra note 70, at 606.
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larly to internal boundaries, is as hard to sustain as a belief that
boundaries can be in a permanent state of flux.
92
Rigid application of the uti possidetis principle to the boundaries
among the existing republics may simply have paved the way to greater
and more intense conflict and conflagration. Long-range stability may
have been the casualty of a misguided extension of a principle which
was of questionable legal validity to begin with.
VI. THE LONGER VIEW: EXTENSION AS DIMINUTION,
DIMINUTION AS EXTENSION
From time to time, the ICJ has been accused of paying excessive
deference to its own jurisprudence, repeating and applying in too facile
and unthinking a manner its earlier pronouncements and formulas in-
stead of bolstering its position with other legal sources.93 As has been
seen, the malady has spread to other tribunals too, with implications
which are less than salutary for the future of international law and inter-
national adjudication. The Badinter Commission offers a good
illustration of the practice and its destructive potential. In matters of
competence, the Commission, like the ICJ, strove to cooperate maxi-
mally with the political organs seeking legal advice, by overlooking and
overcoming the objections of states whose interests were factually, if
not formally, being adjudicated. But the inappropriate employment of
the Court's "duty-to-cooperate-barring-compelling-countervailing-
reasons" doctrine was not cost-free. The consent of states is not an ex-
pendable item in international adjudication, for consent normally
determines, ultimately, the acceptability and effectiveness of the pro-
92. OWEN, supra note 2, at 33-34. See also id. at 34-35 (citing the views of Milovan
Djilas that the internal borders "were made quickly during a march, without the fullest con-
sideration," that they were "often arbitrary and driven by political expediency," and that
"they were never intended to be international boundaries"). In similar vein, Alexander Kara-
georgevitch (Crown Prince of Yugoslavia), writing in August 1992, observed:
The country's internal boundaries, arbitrarily drawn by Tito in 1945, punished the
Serbs by leaving a third of them outside Serbia. Such borders are incompatible
with democratic principle because they were never negotiated, let alone ratified by
freely elected assemblies. A solution that would satisfy the aspirations of virtually
all ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia, except the largest-the almost 10 mil-
lion Serbs-is bound to fail.
Alexander Karageorgevitch, Punish Serbia's Rulers, Not Its People, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 11,
1992, at A19.
93. See, for example, the complaint of Peter H.F. Bekker, in International Decisions, 91
AM. J. INTL'L L. 522 (1997), that in the Oil Platforms (Jurisdiction) case, the ICJ used its
own precedents as an exclusive basis for finding law, without proffering other legal sources.
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nouncements of the tribunal. 94 By its sleight-of-hand and confused rea-
soning on competence, the Commission discredited itself as a quasi-
judicial body without making its opinions more acceptable to the injured
party.
With respect to matters of substance, the Commission's broadening
of the uti possidetis principle to embrace internal administrative bor-
ders, its misreading of the International Court's dictum in support, and
its several other surprising assertions with respect to the status and con-
tent of the principle of self-determination and of minorities' rights-all
could not but sow doubts as to the rigor with which the Commission
was able or willing to apply legal rules. If the Commission was more a
political/legal than a purely legal forum, however, why turn to it for le-
gal advice? Why not leave matters exclusively in the hands of avowedly
political actors?95
For those seeking to enhance the role of international adjudication
in self-determination questions, the pronouncements of the Badinter
Commission were surely uninspiring. A less expansive view by the
Commission of its own competence and of substantive international law
might well have instilled greater confidence, thereby registering a net
gain in the quest for increased rationality and legal principle in world
affairs.
94. See, for example, the observation of Leo Gross regarding the practical consequences
of abandoning the former League requirement of consulting the Court only on the basis of
unanimity: "The United Nations now ... [had] at its disposal an effective procedure for
requesting advisory opinions but not a procedure for effective advisory opinions." Gross,
supra note 69, at 369.
95. The Commission has been faulted, inter alia, for legitimating prematurely the disin-
tegration of Yugoslavia and the recognition of its republics as sovereign states-especially,
and most fatefully, of Bosnia, thus paving the way for the subsequent imbroglio and inferno.
See generally supra note 70, and, in particular, the statement of Szasz, and Badinter's own
later assessment of the effect of early recognition of Bosnia. The conclusion in Hannum,
Self-Determination, supra note 80, at 69, that "the EC and its Arbitration Commission appear
to have based their judgments on geopolitical concerns and imaginary principles of interna-
tional law, not on the unique situation in Yugoslavia," seems justified. See also id.
(commenting on the harmful long-term implications of that part of the Commission's rea-
soning, which suggests that federal states are more vulnerable, legally, to secessionist
demands than are unitary states). The upshot could be (and in the case of Mali, may already
have been) "a reluctance by central authorities to grant constitutional devolution, if such
devolution carries within it the seeds of a right to secession." Weller, supra note 2, at 606 &
n. 215. For many groups, the ultimate result might well be a net diminution of true "self-
determination."
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